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The great age of American philosophy, dominated by the figures of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Charles S. Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, and John 
Dewey, consistently draws the attention of scholars from a variety of disci- 
plines. These philosophers serve as a source of inspiration, a tradition to be 
appropriated, and a subject for sustained analysis. As debate about the nature 
of truth, the role of language, and the relationship between theory and prac- 
tice rages in the humanities -occasionally drawing even historians into this 
thicket of controversy - the responses of an earlier generation of philosophers 
to these problems are increasingly interesting and important. Indeed, for 
those working in a postmodernist vein, American pragmatists immediately 
present themselves as formidable precursors. Those more comfortable with 
a traditionalist approach to meaning are drawn to the via media, or sweet rea- 
sonableness, in the formulations of American pragmatists, especially in con- 
trast to the rough waves that break from the sea of recent French theory. 
Nevertheless, viewed from any vantage point, the golden age of American 
philosophy, from Emerson through Dewey, stands as the foundation upon 
which much of our present-day intellectual assumptions rest, sometimes 
comfortably, sometimes precariously. 
The rich soil of thought in this period of American philosophy has been 
well tilled, but Cornel West and Daniel J. Wilson, each in his own fashion, 
seeks to coax yet another crop from it. Wilson's is the more traditional work, 
building upon and invariably seconding the analyses of Bruce Kuklick and 
James T. Kloppenberg. I Wilson focuses on the engagement of American phi- 
losophy with the power of science and the desire for a community of inter- 
Reviews in American History 18 (1990) 519-524 ? 1990 by The Johns Hopkins University Press 
E UENCES?
he erican asion ilosophy: nealogy atism.
i .
); ).
l . . ience, unity, e ransformation erican i-
hy, . i : i .
.
,
l l . , es,
, t i
p er iti
i te , l
, l n c-
s ccasionally
li r
.
r t ti
s i le s s. le t
iti ali t i edia, t -
, l ti ti
.
r s, ed
, ,
ly, riously.
i t p
.
' iti al
i l i ce lic
es . l r . 1 ent
r
ie s erican © ins r ity
520 REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY / DECEMBER 1990 
pretation, all played out within the context of professionalization. West's 
book is both challenging and enlightening, but also frustrating and diffuse. 
It pushes the edges of our understanding of the American philosophical tra- 
dition, with much that will be fascinating to historians, and especially to phi- 
losophers. West's alliterative characterization of the contours of American 
philosophy could be used to designate his own work's "preoccupation with 
power, provocation, and personality" (p. 5). 
Beginning in the final decades of the nineteenth century, American phi- 
losophy, like a host of other disciplines, entered into its professional phase. 
Once the exclusive preserve of moralists and theologians, philosophy in the 
academy became a more specialized and scientific pursuit. The academization 
of philosophy opened up positions for secular thinkers, promoted a sense of 
community, and allowed for a technical and specialized discourse to rise to 
prominence. Whereas thinkers as important as William James and G. Stanley 
Hall had faced a barren plain for professional careers in the late 1860s and 
early 1870s, by the 1880s the philosophical enterprise had become a staple of 
academic life. Yet even as philosophy became a subject freed from theological 
pretensions, its status as the "queen of the sciences" came under increasing 
attack from the harder sciences. Psychology, once the stepchild of philoso- 
phy, rose to prominence by basing its approach solidly upon a scientific foot- 
ing. In the view of one of its most vociferous proponents, J. McKeen Cattell, 
"the twilight of philosophy can be changed to its dawn only by the light of 
science, and psychology can contribute more light than any other science" 
(Wilson, p. 106). Sentiments such as this, tied to the cultural and intellectual 
hegemony then exercised by science led, by the turn of the century, to a crisis 
of faith among philosophers. Resolution depended upon how successfully 
philosophers incorporated the scientific point of view within their discourse 
and upon how well philosophers were able to develop the autonomy of their 
discipline within the university system. 
The two problems were not distinct, for the success of philosophy within 
the academy often seemed to be a function of philosophers' ability to convince 
others, as well as themselves, of philosophy's congruence with science. The 
first generation of American philosophers had successfully, through the doc- 
trine of pragmatism, steered a middle course between the presumably con- 
tending forces of science and religion. The generations that followed faced 
the rapacious appetite of the scientific ideal. In the emergent university sys- 
tem, where prestige and power were closely wedded to one's scientific cre- 
dentials, the "cash value" of philosophy appeared to be paid out in a defla- 
tionary currency. Wilson carefully demonstrates how philosophers 
attempted to make science a centerpiece in their thought process. In a sense, 
this imperative was undertaken with less ease of operation than it had been 
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by an earlier generation of thinkers. After all, both James and Peirce had 
brought to philosophical study a firm training in the sciences; they well un- 
derstood both the promises and dangers of a scientific frame of mind. Al- 
though less well trained in the practice of science, John Dewey and Arthur 
0. Lovejoy, for example, were paradigmatic of those philosophers who at- 
tempted to install scientific method into the philosophical enterprise. Philos- 
ophers deferred to the ideal of science because it offered a method of research 
and potential for an agreed upon subject matter, but also because it promoted 
a notion of a community that might arrive at common conclusions, and hence 
flirt with the apprehension of truth. 
In practice, while nearly all philosophers paid obeisance to science, each 
thinker came up with a different solution about how science might influence 
philosophy or how philosophy might become more scientific. Some philos- 
ophers, such as James and Dewey, while recognizing that philosophy could 
benefit from the method and communal nature of science, never went so far 
as to suggest that philosophy become a science. Peirce, in contrast, pushed 
hard for a more scientific philosophy, willingly jettisoning literary elegance 
for technical terminology. Philosophy would, for Peirce, come to resemble 
the natural sciences, with investigators inching toward truth defined as a de- 
veloping community of agreement. Morris R. Cohen believed that science 
would "cure speculative excesses" common to metaphysical inquiry, and that 
science offered philosophers a model of self-criticism. Yet Cohen rejected the 
increasingly technical and specialized flavor of philosophy, and maintained 
that philosophers must "never lose sight of the macrocosm" (p. 164). 
The story that Wilson narrates is not necessarily one of success or progress. 
He readily admits that the evolution of philosophy from its theological and 
moral foundations to its scientific imperative and language was neither com- 
plete nor without a downside. Technical precision became more common and 
enticing but its social power declined-no longer would philosophy com- 
mand a wide public audience. And, as Wilson indicates in a concluding precis 
of recent debates about the nature of philosophy being waged by Richard 
Rorty, Richard Bernstein, and others, it is uncertain whether ideals of truth 
and logical precision adhered to by earlier philosophers who embraced the 
scientific model have yielded results worth celebrating. But credits and debits 
notwithstanding, "the impact of science was clear. Science had affected both 
the development of their [philosophers'] ideas and the intellectual and social 
matrix within which they worked" (p. 182). 
It remains uncertain, however, what consequences the ideal of science had 
upon the everyday practice and teaching of philosophy throughout America, 
at least through the 1930s. Did a technical approach to logic and epistemology 
replace the traditional philosophical engagement with moral and religious 
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questions? Had these new concerns gained the status of a philosophical par- 
adigm by 1920? Certainly the fullest evaluation of this shift to a technical and 
professional philosophy, as revealed in Kuklick's statistical analysis of the 
Ph.D. program at Harvard, indicates that the glory days of morality as the 
chief concern of philosophers in America had passed by the first decades of 
the twentieth century. "Scholarly pursuits and professional careers," in Wil- 
son's similar perspective, became the defining marks of the new generation 
of philosophers. Philosophers would find in the methodology and highly 
technical language of logical positivism and later analytic philosophy a do- 
main that allowed them to cohere into a self-reproducing community of phi- 
losopher-scientists with little or no concern for the general intellectual prob- 
lems that had perplexed philosophers in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
Yet Wilson demonstrates that a number of leading philosophers were ag- 
itated by the scientific-technical turn of philosophy. Their voices may be read 
as lonely, disgruntled testaments to the triumph of technical philosophy in 
the academy by 1920. But more research is required to determine the extent 
of such protests: How strong was the imperative for philosophers to address 
public issues in the years before the Second World War? How many philos- 
ophers, scattered in academic programs around the country, continued in 
their philosophy to propose Deweyean social reconstruction in a time of cul- 
tural crisis, thereby continuing the earlier tradition of the philosopher as pub- 
lic intellectual? 
Although many philosophers' texts dealing with the issue of science are 
examined by Wilson, his work remains marred by a certain sense of abstrac- 
tion at two different levels. First, from a Foucauldian perspective, one must 
inquire how philosophy functioned to produce knowledge and truth that ex- 
ercised power and thereby defined the limits and possibilities of thought. 
Second, Wilson seems to forget the intimate relation between philosophy and 
the Darwinian revolution. Evolutionary thought was critical to the philoso- 
phy of James, Dewey, and even Peirce. James's espousal of religion, in part, 
was made possible by his clever use of the Darwinian ideal of survival value 
in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), while Dewey moved easily from 
Hegelianism to a historically-based philosophy by recourse to Darwinian 
ideas of process and change. By barely touching upon the impact of Darwin- 
ism on philosophical discourse, Wilson's discussion of science and philoso- 
phy becomes needlessly reified. 
If Wilson, the historian, focuses on the internal history of philosophers in 
search of a method and community, Cornel West, the philosopher, chooses 
to examine how American philosophers and thinkers as diverse as W. E. B. 
DuBois, C. Wright Mills, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Lionel Trilling, working in 
a pragmatic mode, have functioned as "cultural critics." Alongside many 
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close readings of particular texts, West's spirited examination of the familiar 
names of American philosophers evaluates the political repercussions of how 
their thought both supported and questioned the realities of American life. 
In essence, West's view of pragmatism finds "profound insights and myopic 
blindnesses, enabling strengths and debilitating weaknesses all resulting 
from the distinctive features of American civilization" (p. 5). These features 
of American society and culture are paradoxical in the extreme -slavery and 
freedom, tradition and change. In this historical and contextual account, 
American pragmatism's power and promise rests in its willingness to engage 
"distinct social and cultural crises" in a future-oriented manner (pp. 5-8). Em- 
phasis upon the duality or paradoxical nature of American pragmatic thought 
allows West to at once celebrate the power and provocation that Emerson, 
James, and Dewey offer while also noting, without pulling any punches, that 
their ideas were supportive of the underside of America, its racism, imperi- 
alism, sexism, etc. 
There is a breathless quality to West's pace and prose. In the space of a 
thirty-page treatment of Emerson, West attempts to compare Emerson with 
Marx, evaluate Emerson's preoccupation with power, analyze Emerson's 
complex views on race, imperialism, the market economy, war, and fate. In 
the same pages, Emerson is characterized as, at turns, a spokesman for a 
particular class formation, an organic intellectual, as well as a quintessential 
American rebel! The bravura inherent in West's analysis is apparent. Histo- 
rians will probably find much of what he says quite acceptable, perhaps even 
less than controversial and they may also consider West's contextualization 
of these thinkers a gesture rather than an example of thick historical descrip- 
tion. 
Philosophers will not be as comfortable with West's sustained social read- 
ing of the history of American philosophy. This is not West's fault. Philoso- 
phers generally prefer the tea of their precursors' thought without the added 
sugar of class or social analysis. In contrast, West recognizes Dewey as a social 
and cultural critic who evaded the traditional problems that are expected to 
be the primary concern of professional philosophers. However, he acknowl- 
edges, but only in passing, Dewey's professional concerns and his allegiance 
to a naturalistic, Aristotelian view of knowledge. What interests West in 
Dewey and other pragmatists, is their evasion of philosophy, their rejection 
of foundationalist or essentialist notions of knowledge and truth, and their 
forthright espousal of philosophy as a conversation and mode of continuous 
inquiry. Following the path blazed by Richard Rorty, albeit with a different 
political agenda, West discovers in the evasion of philosophy and the adop- 
tion of cultural criticism a beneficent defining mark of the American pragmatic 
tradition. 
Some will find West's attempt to wrestle a meaningful, sustained tradition 
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out of a diverse group of thinkers a heroic reconceptualization of the past. It 
is not always clear how useful the created tradition is, since so much of it, in 
West's own view, founders on the shoals of racism, naive individualism, and 
class constraints. This is not a book for those faint of heart at the thought of 
a historian-philosopher employing the past for present-day political con- 
cerns: this is a leftist political work without apologies. In his concluding chap- 
ter, "Prophetic Pragmatism," West fires off a jeremiad, in the tradition of those 
thinkers he has been studying. The prophetic pragmatist perspective, the po- 
litical position that West adopts, combines aspects of Emersonian democracy, 
Deweyean historicism, and Peircean ideals of community, to name only a few 
of its sources. Neither utopian nor pessimistic, prophetic pragmatism, in the 
tradition of William James and Reinhold Niebuhr, "promotes the possibility 
of human progress and the human impossibility of paradise" (p. 229). None- 
theless, West's view is more than a variant of "chastened liberalism" or po- 
litical quietism. On the contrary, he contends that prophetic pragmatism will 
creatively join thought and action in a postmodern fashion. The evasion of 
epistemology-centered philosophy that stands as the centerpiece of the 
American philosophical tradition will function as a call to "serious thought 
and moral action" under the sign of the best that exists within religious and 
secular modes of interpretation and experience (p. 239). 
One need not share West's political perspective to find his book an intrigu- 
ing example of a historical-philosophical text that attempts to reconcile two 
opposing approaches to historical study. If the lines between a contextualist 
approach enunciated by David Hollinger and a textualist analysis promoted 
by David Harlan in their American Historical Review debate seem at times too 
rigid, then West's book commendably attempts to combine the approaches.2 
He is certainly enthusiastic in placing his philosophers within the context of 
society, while also using history in a creative sense, to develop a tradition that 
speaks less to firm notions of static historical meaning than to the develop- 
ment of a historical past that is intended to lead its readers to a heightened 
awareness of the power of thought and tradition. And, perhaps, that is one 
of the critical consequences of history if not of truth. 
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published William James, Public Philosopher (1990). 
1. Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930 
(1977); James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in Euro- 
pean and American Thought, 1870-1970 (1986). 
2. David Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature," and David A. Hol- 
linger, "The Return of the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical Knowing" and Harlan's 
"Reply to David Hollinger," in American Historical Review 94 (June 1989): 581-626. 
i l . t
aditi ,
cis , i
i ts. is t
i l
s: l t l
, rophetic tis , es , iti
ti
i l c ,
ean i i ,
t r ti ,
iti es ro ot
i . ).
li
l i ry, ti
ti l t r
-centered p i
iti ll s i t
l
ti . .
i
i il
i i l en
r l
l erican torical iew
2
i l phers t
ti , iti
i i l
i l d t ned
r t iti .
i i l s .
orge kin, lifornia technic te rsity, is ispo, s tly
lished , li pher ).
ce klick, he ise erican ilosophy: bridge, ssachusetts, -1930
77); es . enberg, certain ictory: cial ocracy d gres ivism ro-
an erican ought, -1970 86).
id t l t ry t r t r id -
r, t r tence t r l ing" '
id llinger," ican ical i .
